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NorEs
speedier method of disposing of civil controveries. Pre-trial procedure was
designed to strip the dispute of non-essentials and to mold it into such
form that disposition of the contest would be fair and proper with the least
amount of time and expense. These objectives can be better accomplished
when the judge acts as an active director of the litigation. With this
informal and expedient method, the pre-trial judge not only advances
the cause of the administration of justice but also enhances the respect of
the public for our courts.
DEAN

BORTHWICK

LIABILITY OF INSURANCE COMPANIES FOR ADVERTISING
ENCOURAGING LOW VERDICTS
In 1953 a group of insurance companies published in several national
magazines' a series of advertisements which related to the verdicts of juries
sitting in judgment on suits involving personal injuries. The advertisements were not directed at any individual litigation and could be interpreted simply as urging jurors to render decisions according to the evidence.
However, connecting the parts of the advertisements dealing with the
effect of high money judgments on the cost of insurance premiums and
with the tendency of jurors to give excessive awards, they could also be
interpreted as attempting to influence juries to render low verdicts. Although all of the advertisements were not the same, there were two features
that were identical; one was the relationship between judgments and the
cost of premiums, and the other was the tendency of jurors to give excessive awards in claims for damages in suits involving personal injuries.
Two cases resulted directly from the aforementioned advertisements.
In Hendrix v. Consolidated Van Lines,2 a proceeding was brought against
two insurance companies for indirect contempt of court in causing the
advertisements to be published. The case grew out of an action for
damages to an automobile and for personal injuries, the plaintiff claiming that a verdict based solely on the evidence had been seriously prejudiced as a result of the advertisements. The trial court found for the
defendant and on appeal the Supreme Court of Kansas held that the contempt charged was criminal and dismissed the case on the ground that
there is no right of appeal from a judgment of not guilty of criminal
contempt.

In Hoffman v. Perrucci,3 while an automobile accident suit

was pending, plaintiffs filed a motion for issuance of a contempt citation
in that the advertisements constituted jury tampering. The trial court
found for the defendant and on appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals the action was dismissed since the motion was one for citation
1.
2.
3.

Life Magazine, Jan. 26, 1953, p. 91; Life Magazine, Mar. 9, 1953, p. 157; The Saturday Evening Post, Feb. 14, 1953, p. 118; The Saturday Evening Post, Mar. 28, 1953,
p. 155.
Hendrix v. Consolidated Van Lines, 176 Kan. 101, 269 P.2d 435 (1954).
Hoffman v. Perrucci, 222 F.2d 709 (3rd Cir. 1955).
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for criminal contempt, from which appeal could only be taken by or on
behalf of the United States.
Whether these advertisements, or advertisements such as these, constitute conduct that would tend in some manner to influence a court's
decisions or impede, embarrass or interrupt a court's proceedings so that
the insurance companies could be held liable, has therefore never been
decided. The purpose of this note is to examine the law applicable to such
publications.
Courts generally consider publications that bring influence upon a
court to be an indirect contempt or a criminal contempt of court. 4 It is
generally held that publications, to constitute a contempt, must relate to
pending litigation or a case presently being litigated before liability might
be imposed upon the publisher. " There is some authority that the power
of the court to punish for contempt is not limited to cases pending, but
those cases refer to contempts committed against a court after it has tried
the case.8 The publication of any article, whether true or false concerning
a pending cause, that tends to impede the orderly administration of justice
in that cause, constitutes a contempt, and the fact that the publisher
believed it to be true is immaterial, except in 'the mitigation of punishment.

7

To prosecute for publications such as those for contempt, it would
seem necessary that the publications only be published in the area of one
court. In this manner the publication would have a direct reference to
the court and could be prosecuted in that it would bring embarrassment
and disrepute to the court by calling the decisions unfair.8 In such an
instance, it would not be necessary that it refer to a pending cause.
It has been suggested that the proper cause of action where no case is
9
pending and the court is scandalized, is prosecution for criminal libel.
The basis for su ch liability at common law is the injurious effect on the
10
Such
public or its tendency to provoke a breach of the public peace.
advertisements would seem to come within these requirements, but, because of the national scale of the publication, proof of the connection of
the libel to the court may be difficult.
A possible solution would be an equitable action, brought by the state,
Van Dyke v. Superior Court, 22 Ariz. 508, 211 Pac. 576 (1922); Freeman v. State,
188 Ark. 1058, 69 S.W.2d 267 (1934); Cormack v. Coleman, 120 Fla. 1, 161 So. 844
(1935).
5. In re San Francisco Chronicle, 1 Cal.2d 630, 36 P.2d 369 (1934); State v. Kaiser,
20 Ore. 50, 23 Pac. 964 (1890); Ex parte Lindsley, 75 Cal. App. 122, 241 Pac. 934
(D.C. of Ape. 1925).
6. In re Chadwick, 109 Mich. 588, 67 N.W. 1071 (1896) ; State ex rel. Attorney General
v. Hildreth, 82 Vt. 382, 74 Ati. 71 (1909).
7. In re San Francisco Chronicle, 1 Cal.2d 630, 36 P.2d 369 (1934).
8. Ex parte Lindsley, 75 Cal. App. 122, 241 Pac. 934 (D.C. of App. 1925); Toledo
Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402, 38 S.Ct. 560, 62 L.Ed. 1186 (1917).
9. In re Fite, 11 Ga. App. 665, 76 S.E. 397 (1912).
10. State v. Gardner, 112 Conn. 121, 151 Atl. 349 (1930); Annenberg v. Coleman, Sheriff,
121 Fla. 133, 163 So. 405 (1935).
4.

NOTES

for an injunction against such an association to prevent any further publications. This injunctive relief may be granted against false and misleading publications which work an irreparable and continuing injury to
the complainant and for which remedy at law is inadequate." Although
these advertisements fit this description, the basis for the injunction
would be to restrain such libels on business and the American courts
12
have declined to extend jurisdiction to restrain these torts.
Perhaps the evil of such advertisements is offset by today's use of
demonstrative evidence and other modern techniques which induce juries
to return with five and six figure awards. Such rationale will not improve
the situation, as the evil, although not great, is still there and is still
without a remedy. As long as insurance companies, or anyone else are
allowed to defend their positions by publications, the contents of which
may not be admissible in a trial, the net result may well be a deterioration
of the effectiveness of our juries rendering verdicts upon the evidence as
presented in the court rooms and result in verdicts based upon "trials by
publication."
JOHN W. PATTNO
11.
12.

Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union No. 3, 45 F. 135 (1891); Shoemaker v.
South Bend Spark Arrestor Co., 135 Ind. 471, 35 N.E. 280 (1893).
Reyes v. Middleton, 36 Fla. 99, 17 So. 937 (1895); Shoemaker v. South Bend Spark
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